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ABSTRACT
EMOTION DYSREGULATION AND MORTALITY SALIENCE
by Toni Brooke Merkey
December 2012
Research generated from Terror Management Theory has demonstrated that
reminding participants of their eventual death increases self-esteem striving and
worldview defense (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). The
hypothesis in the present study is that individuals higher in emotion dysregulation will
engage in higher levels of worldview defense than those lower in emotion dysregulation.
This hypothesis was based on the assumption that individuals high in emotion
dysregulation will have a greater need to regulate their emotions by engaging in
worldview defense after being asked to think about their own death than will nonemotionally dysregulated individuals. To test this hypothesis, 110 undergraduate
participants were randomly assigned to a mortality salience or control condition. All
participants completed the Differences in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS). Level of
worldview defense was measured by participants’ reactions to pro- vs. anti-American
essays. The results were analyzed using a regression model, with DERS scores
standardized and treated as a continuous measure. The overall regression model was not
significant. The regression model was non-significant when condition was entered alone
in the first step of the regression equation and remained non-significant when DERS
scores were entered into the second step. Exploratory analyses examined the moderating
role of neuroticism and extraversion; neither significantly moderated the relation between
mortality salience and worldview defense. Possible reasons for a failure to achieve a main
ii

effect for condition, such as possible experimenter or sample characteristics, are
explored. Possible reasons why emotion dysregulation did not moderate the association
between mortality salience and worldview defense included failure to achieve a main
effect of condition, the possibility that people high in emotion dysregulation “checkedout” of the study when they began feeling emotional distress, or that emotion
dysregulation is simply unrelated to worldview defense following mortality reminders.
Future research could explore whether extraversion moderates the relation between
mortality salience and worldview defense if and when a main effect of condition is
present.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) is
one of several theories that speculate on the purpose of self-esteem. According to TMT,
the function of self-esteem is to buffer us from the anxiety we could potentially
experience due to the knowledge of our eventual death. As humans, we have this
knowledge, and need self-esteem to shield us from the terror that would otherwise result
(Pyszczynski et al., 2004).
According to the theory, one’s worldview plays a critical role in this process,
because worldviews are
humanly constructed shared symbolic conceptions of reality that give meaning,
order, and permanence to existence; provide a set of standards for what is
valuable; and promise some form of either literal or symbolic immortality to those
who believe in the cultural worldview and live up to its standards of value
(Pyszczynski et al., 2004, p. 436).
It is one’s worldview that gives meaning to one’s life. The worldview provides the
possibility of one’s life having meaning beyond death, either literally with the promise of
an afterlife, or in a symbolic manner such as by having descendants (Pyszczynski et al.,
2004). However, simply having a worldview is not enough. Individuals must feel that
they are contributing to the culture that they subscribe to in order to benefit from it as a
death-anxiety buffer (Arndt & Greenberg, 1999). If individuals feel as though they are
living up to the standards of their worldview, then high self-esteem and low death-related
anxiety result (Pyszczynski et al., 2004).
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Although many studies have found that reminders of mortality lead to increases in
worldview defense (for a meta-analytic review of studies relating to Terror Management
Theory, see Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010), there are individual differences in the use
of worldview defense. For example, neuroticism has been found to moderate the effect
of mortality salience on worldview defense (discussed in greater detail below). One
potential moderating variable that has not yet been studied is emotion dysregulation.
High levels of emotion dysregulation have been linked to psychological disorders such as
borderline personality disorder (Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, Lejuez, & Gunderson, 2006;
Linehan, 1993) and generalized anxiety disorder (Mennin, Holaway, Fresco, Moore, &
Heimberg, 2007). How will individuals high in emotion dysregulation react when asked
to contemplate their own mortality? Will they engage in more worldview defense than
others in an attempt to regulate their emotional state, or will they engage in less because
they are less willing or able?
Overview of Terror Management Theory
A basic premise of TMT is that individuals’ cultural worldviews buffer them from
the anxiety associated with the knowledge of their eventual death. This process leads to
high motivation for the individual to maintain a belief in his or her worldview and to
defend it when it is threatened (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon,
1989). In a series of studies, Rosenblatt et al. (1989) looked at how increasing mortality
salience affects participants’ views of those who violate or live up to cultural
expectations. In their first study, experimenters used municipal court judges as
participants. They made mortality salient to half of these participants by having them
complete questionnaires concerning their feelings about their own eventual death. The
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participants were then asked to set “bond” for a hypothetical prostitute; the crime of
prostitution was chosen because it “emphasized the moral nature of the alleged crime”
(Rosenblatt et al., 1989, p. 682). Participants in the mortality salience condition assigned
a significantly higher bond to the prostitute than the control participants. The researchers
concluded that “inducing subjects to think about their mortality presumably increased
their need for faith in their values, and thus increased their desire to punish the moral
transgressor” (Rosenblatt et al., 1989, p. 683).
In the same paper, Rosenblatt et al. (1989) tested another hypothesis derived from
Terror Management Theory. Mortality salience should not only affect desire to punish
moral transgressors; it should also affect desire to reward those who uphold moral values
(Rosenblatt et al., 1989). In addition to having participants make a bond assessment for a
hypothetical prostitute as in their previous study, participants were asked to “recommend
a reward for a woman who helped police apprehend a criminal” (Rosenblatt et al., 1989,
p. 684). Participants in the mortality salience condition offered a much higher reward to
someone who upheld the cultural worldview.
Greenberg et al., (1990) conducted several studies that examined the link between
mortality salience and defense of the participants’ worldview. In their first study,
Christian participants who were reminded of their mortality by being asked to write about
it later rated Christians more positively than Jews on the Interpersonal Judgment Scale
(IJS). In their third study, participants in the mortality salience condition rated those who
had a high opinion of the participants’ own worldview, in the form of pro-United States
statements, more positively than did control participants. They also rated others who had
a negative view of the United States more negatively than did control subjects.

4
Kasser and Sheldon (2000, study 1) demonstrated the effect of mortality salience
on another concept thought to be typical of the worldview of those in the United States –
financial gain. According to Terror Management Theory, participants who are reminded
of their mortality should increase their financial pursuits to bolster this worldview.
Participants in the mortality salience condition wrote about their own death, whereas
control participants were asked to write about music. When asked about their expected
future financial status, participants in the mortality salience condition expected to be
worth more financially than control subjects. Mortality salient subjects also expected to
engage in more pleasure spending than control subjects.
Rosenblatt et al. (1989) examined alternative explanations for the effect of
mortality salience on the worldview defense measures used. One alternative possibility
they investigated was that negative affect, resulting from being reminded of death, caused
the observed differences between the experimental and control groups. In the first three
of their studies, mortality salience was manipulated by including a questionnaire that
asked two questions: 1) “what will happen to them as they physically die” and 2) “the
emotions that the thought of their own death arouses in them” (Rosenblatt et al., 1989).
Participants in the control condition did not receive this questionnaire. Negative affect
was assessed in both mortality salience and control participants using the Multiple Affect
Adjective Checklist (MAACL; Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965, as reported in Rosenblatt et
al., 1989). Across all three studies, the researchers found no indication that the mortality
salience manipulation altered affect (Rosenblatt et al., 1989).
In Experiment 4 in the same series of studies, the authors tested the alternative
possibility that increased self-awareness, resulting from self-reflection in the mortality
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salience manipulation, was causing the observed differences between groups. They
performed the same mortality salience manipulation performed in Experiment 3, but had
some participants complete the questionnaires in front of a mirror. The purpose of the
mirror was to increase self-awareness (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). If the observed
differences between mortality salience and control participants was the result of increased
self-awareness on the part of the participants in the mortality salience condition, then
participants who did not experience the mortality salience manipulation but who filled
out their questionnaires in front of a mirror should have the same level of worldview
defense as those in the mortality salience condition. The researchers, however, found no
significant differences between control subjects who completed questionnaires in front of
a mirror and those who did not.
Another alternative explanation assessed by Rosenblatt et al. (1989) was the
possibility that their findings were the result of increased arousal in the mortality salience
condition. In Experiment 4, researchers essentially conducted a modified replication of
Experiment 1 with the addition of measuring skin reactance, pulse rate, and pulse volume
for all participants in order to examine arousal. Researchers did not find significant
differences between mortality salience and control participants on any of the arousal
measures.
Mortality salience does not always intensify negative reactions to those who
contradict participants’ worldviews. Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, and
Chatel (1992) hypothesized that the effects of mortality salience on reactions to
individuals who hold different beliefs would be attenuated when the value of tolerance
was either very important or easily accessible to the participant. In their first study, they
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used political ideology as a basis for assessing the effects of mortality salience when
tolerance was highly important to some individuals. Evidence indicates that in Western
countries, liberals tend to be more tolerant than conservatives (Stone, 1980, as cited in
Greenberg et al., 1992). Participants were screened for their political ideology and were
chosen for the study if they held either strongly liberal or strongly conservative beliefs.
Mortality was made salient to half of the participants. The outcome measure consisted of
participants’ ratings of an extremely liberal other and an extremely conservative other,
based on surveys supposedly filled out by those individuals. Therefore all participants
evaluated both a liberal and a conservative individual. In the control condition,
researchers found a significant tendency for subjects to prefer the target similar to
themselves. In the mortality salience condition, the expected effect of an increased
preference for similar targets and a decreased preference for dissimilar targets was found,
but only for conservative participants. As predicted, liberal participants neither increased
their preference for similar others nor decreased their preference for dissimilar others
based on the mortality salience manipulation. The authors concluded that the effect of
the mortality salience manipulation was attenuated in liberal participants because they
placed a higher premium on the value of tolerance as a part of their worldview
(Greenberg et al., 1992).
Given the possibility that mortality salience may have simply increased
preference for conservative values in both liberal and conservative participants, the
authors conducted a second study in which the value of tolerance was primed in some
individuals. Participants’ evaluations of foreign students, one with a pro-U.S. view and
the other with an anti-U.S. view, served as the dependent measure. The priming of
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tolerance attenuated the preference for the pro-U.S. student over the anti-U.S. student, but
only in the mortality salience condition. This effect primarily occurred because of an
increased preference for the anti-U.S. student among participants who were primed and
were also in the mortality salience condition. Greenberg et al. (1992) concluded that the
value of tolerance can counteract the effects of mortality salience on reactions to
dissimilar others, either when it is primed or when it is important to the individual.
Moderators of the Effects of Mortality Salience
Although the effects of mortality salience on worldview defense have been
demonstrated in numerous studies, this effect might be moderated by various personality
or individual difference variables. In a series of three studies, Goldenberg, Pyszczynski,
McCoy, Greenberg, and Solomon (1999) examined the moderating role of neuroticism on
the effect of mortality salience on the appeal of physical sex. Using TMT as a
framework, the authors proposed that sex reminds us of our animal nature, which in turn
reminds us of our mortality. In order to deal with this awareness, humans give sex
meaning and incorporate it into our worldview. This association, however, is a problem
for individuals high in neuroticism, because neuroticism has been found to correlate with
worry about sex, guilt about sex, and the belief that sex is disgusting (Eysenck, as cited in
Goldenberg et al., 1999). Based on this premise, the authors hypothesized that
participants high in neuroticism would find physical sex less appealing after being
reminded of death than either participants low in neuroticism or those high in neuroticism
who had not been reminded of death. In the first study, the effect of mortality salience on
appeal of sexual experiences was assessed, using neuroticism as a potential moderator of
any effects. All participants completed the Neuroticism subscale of the Eysenck
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Personality Inventory (Eysenck & Eysenck, as cited in Goldenberg et al., 1999).
Participants in the mortality salience condition completed a questionnaire consisting of
15 true-false questions about death, whereas control participants answered a similar
questionnaire on watching television. Appeal of both the physical and romantic aspects
of sex were examined using a 20 item measure. After a median split was conducted on
neuroticism scores, the 2 (neuroticism) X 2 (mortality salience) ANOVA yielded a
significant interaction. In the mortality salience condition, participants high in
neuroticism rated physical sex less appealing than in the control condition. Participants
low in neuroticism rated physical sex as being more appealing in the mortality salience
condition than in the control condition.
In the second study, the authors explored whether death-related thoughts were
more accessible in individuals high in neuroticism after exposure to cues invoking the
physical aspects of sex. Individuals low and high in neuroticism were asked to fill out
questionnaires on either the romantic or the physical aspects of sex. After completing the
questionnaires, participants engaged in a word completion task where some of the words
could be completed with either death-related or neutral words. The authors hypothesized
that neurotic individuals who completed the questionnaire on the physical aspects of sex
would have greater access to death-related thoughts than either individuals low in
neuroticism or other individuals high in neuroticism who had completed the
questionnaire on the romantic aspects of sex. As in Study 1, a median split was
conducted on neuroticism scores and a 2 (neuroticism) X 2 (physical vs. romantic sex)
ANOVA yielded a significant interaction. Further analysis revealed that individuals high
in neuroticism completed more death-related words following the questionnaire on
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physical sex than those who completed the questionnaire on romantic sex. The analyses
did not reveal any other significant differences.
In the third study of the series, the authors hypothesized that explicitly connecting
sex with love would reduce the accessibility of death-related thoughts in individuals high
in neuroticism. To test this hypothesis, Study 2 was replicated. However, before
completing the questionnaire on either romantic or physical sex, participants were asked
to think about either love or eating a good meal. Again, a median split was conducted on
neuroticism scores. 2 (neuroticism) X 2 (physical vs. romantic sex questionnaire) X 2
(love or eating) ANOVA was conducted. Further analyses showed that individuals high
in neuroticism completed more death-related words after completing the physical sex
questionnaire than after completing the questionnaire on romantic sex; additionally, they
completed more death-related words after completing the physical sex questionnaire than
those low in neuroticism. However, when individuals high in neuroticism were asked to
think about love before they completed the questionnaires, this effect disappeared.
In a series of studies, Goldenberg et al. (2006) examined the moderating effects
of neuroticism on the relation between mortality salience and physical sensations. In
Study 1, researchers examined the effect of mortality salience on performance on a coldpressor task. They hypothesized that individuals high in neuroticism would perform
more poorly after being made to think of their eventual death than would people low in
neuroticism. Participants in the mortality salience condition completed questionnaires
asking them to a) describe the feelings they experience when they think of their own
death and b) what they believe will physically happen to them when they die. Control
participants answered a parallel questionnaire concerning failing an important exam. The
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cold-pressor task involved participants submerging their forearm in cold water.
Participants then completed a questionnaire concerning their subjective evaluation of the
cold-pressor task. A multiple regression analysis indicated that there was the expected
neuroticism by mortality salience interaction. Participants high in neuroticism in the
mortality salience condition spent less time on the cold-pressor task than high
neuroticism participants in the control condition.
In Study 2, Goldenberg et al. (2006) sought to replicate the findings of Study 1
with a pleasurable physical task. The basic design of Study 1 was replicated, with an
electronic foot massager replacing the cold-pressor task. A multiple regression analysis
revealed an interaction between neuroticism and mortality salience. High neuroticism
participants spent less time using the massager in the mortality salience condition.
Participants low in neuroticism did not spend less time using the massager in the
mortality salience condition than those in the control condition.
In an unpublished study conducted by the author of the current study (Merkey,
2009), health anxiety was examined as a moderator of worldview defense following a
mortality salience manipulation. The primary hypothesis was that health anxiety would
attenuate the effects of mortality salience on worldview defense, based on the premise
that health-anxious individuals are chronically more aware of their own mortality. The
Illness and Attitudes Scale (IAS) was administered to college students to determine level
of health anxiety. Participants were randomly assigned to either a mortality salience or
control condition. Worldview defense was measured by participants’ reactions to pro- vs.
anti-American essays. Because neuroticism had previously been found to be related to
both health anxiety (Cox, Borger, Asmundson, & Taylor, 2000) and the effects of TMT
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(Goldenberg et al., 1999) neuroticism was assessed using the neuroticism subscale of the
Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991). A regression model was used
to analyze the results, with IAS scores standardized and treated as a continuous measure.
As predicted, there was a significant IAS x Condition interaction. However, the direction
of the relation was in the opposite direction than hypothesized, with individuals higher in
health anxiety engaging in more worldview defense after being reminded of their
eventual death than individuals lower in health anxiety. To determine the effects of
neuroticism on worldview defense, the neuroticism subscale of the BFI was entered into
the regression equations for the control condition and for the mortality salience condition.
The unique variance of neuroticism was not significant in either equation.
The Effect of Mortality Salience on Affect
DeWall and Baumeister (2007) conducted a series of three experiments to
examine the possibility that individuals unconsciously tune in to positive emotional
information after exposure to a mortality salience manipulation. They hypothesized that
individuals respond to the thought of their own death by unconsciously seeking out or
tuning in to positive stimuli. In all three of their experiments, participants in the
experimental condition were asked to contemplate their own death, and participants in the
control condition were asked to contemplate dental-pain. In their first experiment, they
found that participants in the mortality salience condition created more emotionally
positive words from word stems than did participants in the control condition. No
significant difference was found between the two conditions on the creation of
emotionally negative words from word stems.
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The second experiment that DeWall and Baumeister (2007) conducted was
designed to replicate the first experiment using a different outcome measure. In addition,
the second experiment reduced the latency between the presentation of the independent
variable and dependent variable that had occurred in the first experiment. Participants
were presented with a word and asked to choose which of two additional words was more
similar to the first word presented. The choices consisted of a word that was emotionally
similar to the target word and a word that was semantically similar to the target word.
They found that participants in the mortality salience condition chose the emotionally
similar word more frequently than those in the control group when the emotionally
similar word had positive connotations.
The third experiment of the series was designed to replicate the results of their
first two studies while examining two additional hypotheses (DeWall & Baumeister,
2007). In the first two experiments, participants had been asked to complete a measure of
their subjective mood or affect after the experimental manipulation, creating a delay
between the manipulation and the respective outcome measures. They dispensed with the
delay in the third experiment, hypothesizing that the observed effect concerning positive
emotions could be seen immediately. Their second hypothesis was that the tuning in to
positive information was something that occurred unconsciously. To test this hypothesis,
they created two additional conditions in which participants were asked to write about
how they think they would feel if they were asked to write about dental pain or their own
death. Each condition was followed by either an implicit (a word stem task) or explicit
(Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1998, as reported in
DeWall & Baumeister, 2007) measure of mood. DeWall and Baumeister (2007)
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hypothesized that participants in the imagined mortality salience condition would predict
the conscious experience of distress, but would not be able to predict the unconscious
coping response of increased tuning to positive affect. A 2 (dental pain vs. mortality
salience) x 2 (actual experience vs. imagined) x 2 (implicit mood vs. explicit mood)
ANOVA was conducted and yielded a three-way interaction. Further analysis indicated
that on the implicit mood measure, subjects in the imagined mortality salience condition
predicted that they would experience more emotional distress than participants in the
actual mortality salience condition reported experiencing. When the implicit mood
measure was examined, participants in the mortality salience condition had a greater
index of positive relative to negative emotion than individuals in the imagined mortality
salience condition. These results support the researchers’ hypotheses that tuning in to
positive affective information occurs automatically following mortality salience, and that
this process occurred unconsciously.
Emotion Dysregulation
Problems in emotion regulation, also known as emotion dysregulation, have been
associated with disorders such as borderline personality disorder (Gratz et al., 2006;
Linehan, 1993), generalized anxiety disorder (Mennin et al., 2007), social anxiety
disorder (Mennin et al., 2007), and major depression (Mennin et al., 2007). In addition,
high levels of emotion dysregulation have been positively correlated with several
problems in adolescents, such as anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation (Weinberg &
Klonsky, 2009). In spite of the implications of emotion dysregulation both clinically and
as a growing area of research, there is a lack of consensus among experts on what
actually constitutes emotion dysregulation.
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Gratz and Roemer (2004) proposed one conceptualization of emotion
dysregulation. They developed a multi-faceted model of emotion regulation, theorizing
that emotion regulation is composed of competence in four areas: 1) awareness of and
understanding of one’s emotions, 2) acceptance of one’s emotions, 3) the ability to
control one’s impulses and work toward goals in spite of negative emotions, and 4) the
ability to use appropriate and effective emotion regulation strategies to regulate
emotional responses, obtain goals, and meet the demands of a situation. A deficit in any
of these areas suggests emotion dysregulation. There are, however, alternative
conceptualizations of emotion dysregulation. For a description of some of the different
proposed definitions of emotion dysregulation, especially as it relates to borderline
personality disorder, see Putnam and Silk (2005).
It has been suggested that certain maladaptive behaviors, such as suicidality or
self-injury, may serve an emotion regulating function in those who otherwise struggle
with emotion dysregulation. For example, Linehan (1993) suggested that in individuals
with borderline personality disorder, suicidal behavior may serve as a form of emotion
regulation. She suggested that suicidal and other maladjusted forms of behavior are
“usually maladaptive solution behaviors to the problem of overwhelming, uncontrollable,
intensely painful negative affect” (Linehan, 1993, p. 60). Individuals with borderline
personality disorder sometimes report feelings of relief after self-harm behaviors such as
cutting oneself (Leinbenluft, Gardner, & Cowdry, 1987, as cited in Linehan, 1993).
Additionally, suicidal and parasuicidal behaviors may serve an additional purpose in
gaining help from others.
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In contrast to Linehan’s (1993) proposal that parasuicidal behaviors serve an
emotion regulatory function for some individuals, Selby, Anestis, and Joiner (2007)
hypothesized that violent daydreaming may be a form of emotion dysregulation in those
who are suicidal. They suggested that those who experience violent daydreams may
desensitize themselves to violence, making it easier to engage in suicidal or parasuicidal
behavior in the future. The researchers used the Beck Depression Inventory, Second
Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Garbin, 1988, as reported in Selby et al., 2007) as a
measure of depression, the Thoughts of Revenge subscale of the Anger Rumination Scale
(ARS; Sukhodolsky, Golub, & Cromwell, 2001, as reported in Selby et al., 2007) to
measure level of violent daydreaming, and the Beck Scale for Suicidal Ideation (BSS;
Beck, Steer, & Ranieri, 1998, as reported in Selby et al., 2007) as the outcome measure of
suicidality. They found that the interaction between depression and violent daydreaming
significantly predicted level of suicidality above and beyond either measure alone. High
levels of both depression and violent daydreaming predicted high levels of suicidality.
When these results are examined in the context of TMT, it is possible that asking
individuals to contemplate their own death in an experimental manipulation might be
akin to what some individuals reported as violent daydreams. Asking participants to
think about their eventual death might lead to an increase in distress in those prone to
emotion dysregulation.
Personality variables, particularly extraversion and neuroticism, have been
associated with emotion dysregulation. For example, Kokkonen and Pulkkinen (2001)
conducted a longitudinal study that examined extraversion and neuroticism as predictors
of later emotion regulation and dysregulation. They hypothesized that extraversion
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would be positively associated with future use of emotion regulation strategies, such as
low emotional ambivalence, use of emotional social support, and use of “Repair,” which
is a “momentary, active attempt to turn a negative emotion toward a more positive
direction” (Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 2001, p. 410). They hypothesized that neuroticism
would be negatively associated with those same strategies. They based their hypotheses
on previous research demonstrating that extraversion was typically associated with
understanding and regulating emotions, whereas neuroticism was associated with traits
such as emotional avoidance (see Kokkonen & Pulkkinen, 2001, for a review of the
previously existing literature). They found that extraversion was associated with later
emotional social support. In women, extraversion was negatively associated with later
emotional avoidance. In men, extraversion was negatively related to later level of Repair.
Neuroticism was positively correlated with later emotional ambivalence in both men and
women. In women, neuroticism was negatively correlated to later emotional social
support. In men, neuroticism was negatively correlated to later use of Repair. Due to the
correlations between both neuroticism and extraversion with emotion dysregulation, these
personality traits were measured and statistically controlled in the current study.
The Present Study
The purpose of the present study was to examine the relation between emotion
dysregulation and Terror Management Theory. How will those who struggle with
emotion regulation react when asked to contemplate their own death? Will they react
more strongly than others and thus engage in more worldview defense in an attempt to
compensate for any negative feelings they might experience in reaction to the
manipulation? Or will a high level of emotion dysregulation leave them less able to use
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worldview defense as a way to compensate for the loss of self-esteem experienced after
contemplating their own death?
No study to date has examined the potential impact of emotion dysregulation on
the relationship between mortality salience and worldview defense. The primary
hypothesis of the proposed study is that high levels of emotion dysregulation will
moderate the previously demonstrated effects of mortality salience on worldview
defense. This hypothesis is based in part on the idea that individuals high in emotion
dysregulation will experience greater distress than other individuals after contemplating
their own death. Providing participants with the opportunity to engage in some form of
worldview defense after reminding them of their eventual death may provide them with a
means of controlling this emotional dysregulation. In the previously discussed series of
studies of studies by DeWall and Baumeister (2007), participants unconsciously sought
out or tuned in to positive stimuli following a mortality salience manipulation. Tuning in
to positive stimuli might have been an unconscious attempt by participants to regulate
their own emotions. The hypothesis of this study is that participants who are already
emotionally dysregulated will have a greater need to engage in an emotion regulation
strategy following mortality reminders than non-emotionally dysregulated participants.
On the other hand, it is possible that those high in emotion dysregulation will
engage in less worldview defense than non-emotionally dysregulated participants
following a mortality salience manipulation. Part of the conceptualization of emotion
dysregulation, as put forth by Gratz and Roemer (2004), entails an impaired ability to use
emotion regulation strategies to regulate emotional responses, obtain goals, and meet the
demands of a situation. If worldview defense serves an emotion regulatory function in
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those who have been asked to contemplate their own death, those who are high in
emotion dysregulation may be less able to use worldview defense to regulate their
emotions. Additionally, Linehan (1993) suggested that suicidal and parasuicidal
behaviors may serve an emotion regulatory function for some individuals. It is possible
that asking individuals high in emotion dysregulation to think about their own death will
serve an emotion regulatory function for them, leaving them with less need to engage in
worldview defense than non-emotionally dysregulated individuals. However, Selby et al.
(2007) suggested that violent daydreaming may actually be a form of emotion
dysregulation. It is possible that asking individuals high in emotion dysregulation to
think about their own death may increase their emotional distress, leaving them with an
increased need to use some method to regulate their emotions.
The first hypothesis examined was that individuals in the mortality salience
condition would engage in greater worldview defense than individuals in the control
condition. This mortality salience effect would simply replicate previous TMT studies
which used methods highly similar to those used in the current study (Greenberg et al.,
1992; Kasser & Sheldon, 2000). The second hypothesis tested was that emotion
dysregulation would moderate the mortality salience effect. Specifically, individuals
higher in emotion dysregulation will engage in greater worldview defense following
mortality reminders than those lower in emotion dysregulation. Because neuroticism and
extraversion are both associated with emotion dysregulation and because neuroticism has
been shown to affect the relationship between mortality salience and a variety of
outcomes (e.g., the appeal of the physical aspects of sex; Goldenberg et al., 1999), the
effects of these personality variables were statistically controlled for in the analyses.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants
The participants were 110 undergraduates from the University of Southern
Mississippi. The mean age of participants was 21.4, SD = 4.3, with a range of 18-44. Of
the 110 participants, 76.4% were female; 33.6% were Caucasian, 60% were African
American, 0.9% were Hispanic or Latino/a, and 4.9% were classified as “other”. The
control condition had 54 participants, whom 11 were male. The experimental condition
had 56 participants, of whom 15 were male. Their participation was in partial fulfillment
of the research participation requirement in their undergraduate psychology courses.
Instruments
The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004)
was used to assess emotion dysregulation. The DERS is a 36-item self-report instrument
designed to assess emotion dysregulation. Although the full DERS is typically used as a
measure of the construct of emotion dysregulation, it has six subscales: Nonacceptance,
Goals, Impulse, Awareness, Strategies, and Clarity (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The testretest reliability of the six subscales ranged from .57 to .80 (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The
initial validation of the measure showed internal consistency (α = .93) and good testretest reliability, which was .88 over a four to eight week period for the overall scale
(Gratz & Roemer, 2004). For the present study, the DERS total was internally consistent,
with α = .92.
Neuroticism and extraversion were assessed with the Neuroticism and
Extraversion subscales of the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John et al., 1991). The Big Five
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Inventory is a 44 item measure of personality that measures the Big Five dimensions of
neuroticism, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and openness. Three month
test-retest reliability for the subscales typically ranges between .80 and .90, and estimates
of internal consistency usually fall between .75 and .90. (John & Srivasta, as cited in
Clark, Boccaccini, Caillouet, & Chaplin, 2007). For the current study, the neuroticism
subscale was internally consistent, with α = .83. The extraversion subscale was also
internally consistent, α = .80.
Participants’ affect was measured using the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS is a 20 item selfreport measure of affect, with 10 of the items forming a positive affect scale, and 10
forming a negative affect scale. The PANAS can be administered with one of several
different time periods specified in the instructions to participants (i.e., “indicate to what
extent you feel this way right now” or “indicate to what extent you have felt this way
today”). For the current study, participants were asked to consider the extent they have
felt each emotion during that day. For that time period, internal consistency for each scale
has previously been estimated at .90 for the positive affect scale and .87 for the negative
affect scale (Watson et al., 1988). For the present study, both scales of the PANAS were
internally consistent, with α = .89 for the positive scale and α = .83 for the negative scale.
The dependent variable, worldview defense, was measured using difference
scores in preference for a pro vs. an anti-American author. Participants received two
essays and were told that these essays were written by foreign students. Essays were
handwritten and presentation order was counterbalanced. This measure, or a variation of
it, has been used in several terror management studies and has yielded moderately high

21
effect sizes (Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; Greenberg, et al., 1992; Harmon-Jones, Simon,
Pyszczynski, Solomon, & McGregor, 1997). The forms used to evaluate each essay
contained three items designed to assess the participants’ evaluation of each author. Each
question was rated on a 9-point Likert-type scale. The three questions asked the
participant to rate 1) how much he or she likes the author; 2) how intelligent the
participant believes the author is; and 3) how knowledgeable the participant believes the
author to be on the subject. After reading each essay, difference scores were calculated
for each individual by subtracting the composite score for the anti-American essay from
the pro-American essay.
Procedure
For the current study, between one and six individuals participated in each
session. Participants were randomly assigned to either the mortality salience or control
condition upon their arrival, at which time they were informed by the experimenter that
they were participating in two short studies. The first study was described as an
assessment of the relationship between personality and reactions to life events.
Participants received a folder containing either a mortality salience questionnaire or a
control questionnaire that inquires about dental pain. The mortality salience
questionnaire asked participants to 1) describe the feelings that the thought of their own
death arouses in them and 2) describe what they think will happen to them physically as
they are dying and once they are dead. The control questionnaire asked participants to 1)
describe the feelings that the thought of experiencing dental pain arouses in them and 2)
describe what they think will happen to them physically when they are experiencing this
pain. The control condition was chosen in an attempt to create an alternate negative
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experience for participants to contemplate in an attempt to control for negative affect.
They were given five minutes to write about the scenario they were assigned. Afterward,
they completed the BFI, then a demographic form requesting that participants provide
their age, race, sex, and year in school. After the completion of the questionnaires, the
folders were collected, signaling the end of the first study.
After the participants completed the first study, they were informed that the
second study is concerned with Americans’ reactions to foreigners’ perspectives on the
United States. This portion of the study is based on the procedure used in Harmon-Jones
et al. (1997, study 2). The participants were asked to read and evaluate two essays,
ostensibly written by foreign students, and to evaluate the essays. Each essay was
presented in turn, along with the evaluation form. The order of presentation of the two
essays was counterbalanced. After participants read and rated each essay, they completed
the PANAS and the DERS.
As previously mentioned, this is the second TMT study conducted by this
researcher. In the previous study (Merkey, 2009), a manipulation check was conducted
after the administration of the mortality salience and control conditions. The results of the
manipulation check indicated that the manipulation was quite strong. Virtually all
participants in the mortality salience condition indicated that the first study made them
think about death while virtually all participants in the control condition indicating that
the first study did not cause them to think about their death. Based on the clear results of
the manipulation check in that study, a manipulation check was not conducted in the
current study.
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After the completion of the second study, participants were thoroughly debriefed.
Due to the minor deception in this study, participants were asked not to disclose the
nature of this study to any other students so that the study was not compromised.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Prior to examining worldview defense scores, it was necessary to determine if a
confound existed between condition and DERS scores. A t-test was conducted to
determine whether there were significant differences in DERS score between the
mortality salience and control groups. There were no significant differences between
groups on the DERS, t (107) = 1.48, p = .14. For the control group, the mean for the
DERS scores was 79.51, SD = 18.45. For the experimental condition, the mean was
73.91, SD = 20.83. The zero-order correlations among neuroticism, extraversion, emotion
dysregulation, gender, negative affect, and worldview defense are depicted in Table 1.
The variables listed in Table 1, with the exception of gender, were tested to ensure that
both skew and kurtosis were within acceptable limits; Kurtosis was within acceptable
limits of +/- 2 for all variables assessed (see Table 2).
Table 1
Indicator Correlations

Neuro

Extra

W.V.D

E.D.

Gender

Neuroticism

0.83

-.10

0.02

0.72*

0.07

0.46*

Extraversion

-.03

0.78

0.02

-.17

-.09

0.03

Worldview Defense

-.07

0.37*

-

0.03

0.21

-.02

E. Dysregulation

0.50*

0.02

-.16

0.92

-.04

-.62*

Gender

0.03

-.10

-.03

.14

-

0.04

Negative Affect

0.41*

0.00

-.06

0.39*

0.08

NA

0.83

25
Table 1 (continued).
Note. The correlations for the control condition (n = 54) are above the diagonal, and the correlations for the mortality salience
condition (n =56) are below the diagonal. Alphas for the full sample are in bold along the diagonal. Neuro = Neuroticism, Extra =
Extraversion, WVD = Worldview Defense, E.D. = Emotion Dysregulation, NA = Negative Affect.
*p < .01

Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, Skew, and Kurtosis

Mean

SD

Skew

Kurtosis

Neuroticism

22.74

6.32

.07

-.78

Extraversion

27.78

5.64

.05

-.78

Worldview Defense

4.78

6.35

-.21

1.59

E. Dysregulation

76.63

19.82

.46

-.42

Negative Affect

17.39

7.07

1.37

1.85

Because the current study had a larger percentage of non-Caucasian participants
than most previous TMT studies, race was recoded (1 = non-Caucasian, 2 = Caucasian)
and a 2 (mortality salience vs. control) X 2 (non-Caucasian vs. Caucasian) ANOVA was
conducted, with worldview difference scores as the outcome measure. Race was not
significant, F (1, 108) = .62, p = .43. Additionally, the race X condition interaction was
not significant, F (1, 108) = .01, p = .92.
The main hypothesis that emotion dysregulation will moderate the relationship
between mortality salience and worldview defense was analyzed using an
ANOVA/regression model. The model included both condition (mortality salience vs.
control) and emotion dysregulation, as measured by the DERS, as independent variables.
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DERS scores were standardized and treated as a continuous measure. Condition was
dummy coded (control = 0, mortality salience = 1), and an interaction term was created
by multiplying condition by standardized DERS scores. Condition was then entered into
the first step of a regression equation, DERS scores were entered into the second step,
and the interaction term was entered in the third step. The difference between
participants’ ratings for pro vs. anti-American essays served as the dependent variable
(i.e., worldview defense).
The overall regression model was not significant, F (3, 105) = 1.45, p = .23, R2 =
.04. The effect of condition did not achieve conventional levels of significance when
entered alone in the first step of the regression equation, β = .17, t (107) = 1.75, p = .08.
Therefore, the difference in worldview defense between the mortality salience and
control conditions were not quite significant. For the control condition, the mean was
3.70 with SD = 6.58. For the mortality salience condition, the mean was 5.80 with SD =
6.01. To determine the effect size of condition, a power analysis was conducted and
yielded a result of d = .33. Additionally, the regression remained non-significant when
standardized DERS scores were entered into the second step of the equation, β = -.07, t
(106) = -.73, p = .47. Although a significant DERS x Condition interaction was
predicted, the interaction was not significant, t (105) = -.88, p = .38 (see Table 3).
A second hierarchical multiple regression was conducted controlling for the
effects of neuroticism and extraversion on worldview defense. The neuroticism and
extraversion subscales of the BFI were standardized. Condition was then entered into the
first step of the regression equation; neuroticism, extraversion, and standardized DERS
scores were entered into the second step, and the DERS x Condition interaction term was
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entered in the third step. The difference between participants’ ratings for pro vs. antiAmerican essays again served as the dependent variable (i.e., worldview defense). The
overall regression model was not significant, F (5, 103) = 1.61, p = .17, R2 = .07. When
neuroticism, extraversion, and DERS scores were entered into the second step of the
model, the regression was non-significant, F (4, 104) = 1.75, p = .15. In the second step,
none of the individual predictors were significant (see Table 4).
Table 3
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Worldview Defense (N = 110)

B

SE B

β

Condition

2.11

1.21

0.17

Condition

1.98

1.22

0.16

Emotion Dysregulation

-0.45

0.61

-.07

Condition

2.02

1.22

0.16

Emotion Dysregulation

0.17

0.94

0.03

Interaction

-1.02

1.24

-.13

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Note. R2 = .03 for Step 1; ΔR2 = .01 for Step 2; ΔR2 = .01 for Step 3
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Table 4
Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Worldview Defense,
Controlling for Neuroticism and Extraversion (N=108)

B

SE B

β

Condition

2.11

1.21

0.17

Condition

1.91

1.22

0.15

Emotion Dysregulation

-.51

0.76

-.08

Neuroticism

0.24

0.77

0.04

Extraversion

1.10

0.60

0.17

Condition

1.93

1.22

0.15

Emotion Dysregulation

0.34

1.13

0.05

Neuroticism

0.05

0.79

0.01

Extraversion

1.16

0.61

0.18

ED x Condition Interaction

-1.31

1.27

-.15

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Note. R2 = .17 for Step 1; ΔR2 = .08 for Step 2; ΔR2 = .02 for Step 3

Exploratory Analysis: Neuroticism and Extraversion as Moderators
To determine the effects of neuroticism on worldview defense, a second
hierarchical multiple regression was conducted. The neuroticism subscale of the BFI was
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standardized and multiplied by condition to create an interaction term. Condition was
then entered into the first step of the regression equation, neuroticism scores were entered
into the second step, and the interaction term was entered in the third step. The difference
between participants’ ratings for pro vs. anti-American essays again served as the
dependent variable (i.e., worldview defense).
The overall regression model was not significant, F (3, 105) = 1.10, p = .53, R2 =
.03. When neuroticism was entered into the second step of the model, the regression
remained non-significant, β = -.02, t (106) = -.23, p = .82. Additionally, the Neuroticism
x Condition interaction was not significant, β = .06, t (105) = .50, p = .62 (see Table 5).
Table 5
Summary of Exploratory Regression Analysis for Neuroticism as a Moderator of
Worldview Defense (N = 108)

B

SE B

β

Condition

2.11

1.21

0.17

Condition

2.07

1.22

0.16

Neuroticism

-0.14

0.62

-.02

Condition

2.07

1.23

0.16

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3
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Table 5 (continued).

B

SE B

β

Neuroticism

0.14

0.83

0.02

Interaction

-.62

1.25

-.06

Note. R2 = .03 for Step 1; ΔR2 = .00 for Step 2; ΔR2 = .00 for Step 3

The same method used above to examine the effects of neuroticism was used to
determine the effects of extraversion. When extraversion was entered into the second step
of the model, the model was significant, F (2, 108) = 3.30, p = .04, R2 = .06. When the
interaction term was entered into the third step, the overall regression model remained
significant, F (3, 105) = 3.45, p = .02, R2 = .03 (see Table 6). Although the overall model
was significant, none of the coefficients for the predictors were.
Table 6
Summary of Exploratory Regression Analysis for Extraversion as a Moderator of
Worldview Defense (N=108)

B

SE B

β

Condition

2.11

1.21

0.17

Condition

1.99

1.19

0.16

Extraversion

1.12

0.60

0.18

Step 1

Step 2
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Table 6 (continued).

B

SE B

β

Condition

1.99

1.18

0.16

Extraversion

0.13

0.79

0.02

Interaction

2.25

1.19

0.26

Step 3

Note. R2 = .03 for Step 1; ΔR2 = .03 for Step 2; ΔR2 = .03 for Step 3

Finally, to determine if individuals high in emotion dysregulation experienced
greater negative affect in the mortality salience condition compared to individuals low in
emotion dysregulation or individuals high in emotion dysregulation in the control
condition, an additional exploratory regression was conducted. The standardized DERS
scores were multiplied by condition to create an interaction term. Condition was then
entered into the first step of the regression equation, DERS scores were entered into the
second step, and the interaction in the third. The outcome variable was the negative affect
scale of the PANAS. When DERS scores were entered into the second step of the model,
the model was significant, F (2, 108) = 17.66, p = .00. When the interaction term was
entered into the third step, the overall regression model remained significant, F (3, 108) =
12.96, p = .00. In the third step, condition was not significant, β = -.038, t (106) = -.45, p
= .67; however, DERS scores were significant, β = .66, t (106) = 5.11, p = .00. The
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condition X DERS interaction was not significant, β = -.22, t (106) = -.1.71, p = .09 (see
Table 7).
Table 7
Summary of Exploratory Regression Analysis for Condition and Emotion Dysregulation
as Predictors of Negative Affect (N=108)

B

SE B

β

Condition

-1.57

1.36

-.11

Condition

-.58

1.20

-.04

Emotion Dysregulation

3.49

0.60

0.49*

Condition

-.53

1.19

-.04

Emotion Dysregulation

4.67

0.91

0.66*

Interaction

-2.06

1.21

-.22

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Note. R2 = .01 for Step 1; ΔR2 = .24 for Step 2; ΔR2 = .02 for Step 3
*p < .01
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The primary hypothesis for this study was that level of emotion dysregulation
would moderate the effects of mortality salience on worldview defense. However,
emotion dysregulation was not a significant moderator of mortality salience on
worldview defense. In addition, this study failed to demonstrate a main effect of
condition; in other words the difference between participants in the mortality salience and
control conditions in worldview defense was not quite significant.
Compared to other TMT studies that used similar methodologies, the small-tomedium effect size in the current study was considerably smaller than the effect sizes
reported in previous studies. Burke et al. (2010) conducted a meta-analysis on all
published TMT studies and reported an average effect size of r = .35 across the studies,
which is equal to d = .75. The average effect size reported in Burke et al. (2010) is
roughly twice as large as the effect size in the present study.
It should be noted that this is the second study run by this researcher in which no
significant main effects for condition were found. The previous study (Merkey, 2009)
with 65 participants, had the same effect size as the current study, d = .33. There are
several potential reasons for this failure to achieve a main effect that has been obtained
by other researchers. Some research indicates that a longer latency between the
presentation of the independent variable and the worldview defense measure leads to a
greater main effect of condition (Burke et al. 2010). Their hypothesis is that defenses
triggered by thoughts of death are strongest when the thoughts of death have exited
consciousness but are still accessible (Arndt, Greenberg, & Cook, 2002, as reported in
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Burke et al., 2010). In Merkey (2009), the delay between the presentation of the
independent variable and the worldview defense measure was very brief, perhaps totaling
one to two minutes. Although the latency in the present study was not measured,
participants completed two measures between the independent variable and the
worldview defense measure. The decision to present two measures between the
independent variable and the dependent measure was based on the meta-analysis by
Burke et al. (2010), which found that the effect size of the worldview defense measure
was larger when two or three measures were administered between the mortality salience
and worldview defense measures instead of zero or one measure. It is possible that this
latency was still not long enough to obtain a main effect of condition.
Another possibility is that there was something specific about the way in which
previous researchers have conducted their studies using these particular measures that the
current researcher failed to do. Although this researcher made efforts to replicate the
methodology used in previous studies, it is possible that something escaped notice.
Additionally, the file drawer bias against the publication of null results raises the
possibility that other researchers have also obtained non-significant results using the
measures employed in this study.
Alternatively, it is worth noting that both the present study and the previous study
conducted by this researcher used students from the University of Southern Mississippi as
participants. To the best of this researcher’s knowledge, the previous study and the
present study are the only studies on Terror Management Theory that have been
conducted at this University. It is possible that characteristics of this particular sample
reduce the MS effect. Although it is difficult to speculate on what these particular
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characteristics might be, some possibilities include reading-level, freedom from
distractibility, conscientiousness, attitudes toward foreign students, or attitudes toward
pro or anti-American sentiments. If Terror Management research is conducted at the
University of Southern Mississippi in the future, a preliminary study could be conducted
to compare characteristics of students at that university to students at universities used in
other Terror Management studies.
The primary hypothesis tested in the current study, that emotion dysregulation
would moderate the relation between mortality salience and worldview defense, was also
not significant. A possible reason for this lack of effect is that people high in emotion
dysregulation did not fully engage in the task. It is possible that they were able to
distance themselves from the task (e.g., “I’m not really dying/failing a test. This is just
for extra credit”). Gratz et al. (2006) found that individuals with Borderline Personality
Disorder (BPD), who are typically high in emotion dysregulation, were less willing to
experience emotional distress while pursuing a goal than were individuals without BPD.
They also found that individuals with BPD were more likely than those without the
disorder to quit a task when they experienced emotional distress. Given these results, it is
possible than individuals high in emotion dysregulation checked out of the current study
when they experienced emotional distress brought on by thoughts of death. They might
have written superficially about death to complete the task and gain extra credit for their
class without fully participating in the assignment. If this is the case, the failure of
individuals high in emotion dysregulation to fully engage in the assignment could have
mitigated any effects that may or may not have been present had they fully participated.
One way of examining this was to examine the interaction between condition and

36
emotion dysregulation to determine if individuals high in emotion dysregulation
experienced less negative affect in the mortality salience condition than in the control
condition. In the present study, although negative affect was related to emotion
dysregulation, there was no condition X emotion dysregulation interaction. Another way
of potentially examining this in the future would be to examine length of time
participants high and low in emotion dysregulation are willing to spend contemplating
their own death by allowing participants an open-ended length of time to write about their
death.
Additionally, without the main effect of condition typically observed in studies of
TMT, it is difficult to say if emotion dysregulation would have moderated the relation
between mortality salience and worldview defense. The absence of a main effect of
condition calls into question whether the mortality salience manipulation worked. If the
manipulation did not work, it makes it difficult to interpret any moderators that either
were found or were not found. .
On the other hand, it is possible that emotion dysregulation is truly unrelated to
worldview defense following reminders of mortality. Some research indicates that,
although emotion dysregulation and negative affect are separate constructs, they are
related (Bradley et al., 2011). Similarly, in the present study, emotion dysregulation was a
significant predictor of negative affect. Worldview defense following mortality salience
has been shown to be unrelated to negative affect in a series of studies (Rosenblatt et al.,
1989). It is therefore possible that emotion dysregulation is unrelated to worldview
defense as well.
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In an exploratory analysis, extraversion and neuroticism were examined as
potential moderators of worldview defense. The overall model for extraversion was
significant; however, none of the coefficients for the predictors were significant. Future
research could explore whether extraversion moderates the relation between mortality
salience and worldview defense when a significant main effect of condition is present.
Neuroticism did not significantly moderate worldview defense. Because
neuroticism and emotion dysregulation are related constructs, perhaps neuroticism,
negative affect, and emotion dysregulation are unrelated to worldview defense following
death reminders.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
One of the limitations of the present study was the use of a college student sample
instead of a clinical sample of emotionally dysregulated patients (e.g., individuals
diagnosed with borderline personality disorder). Although emotion dysregulation is
conceptualized as a dimensional construct, it is possible that those at extremely high end
of the spectrum would have responded differently when asked to contemplate their own
mortality. This could be explored in the future through replication of this study with a
clinical sample.
Another potential limitation is this experimenter’s repeated failure to duplicate the
effect of mortality salience on worldview defense reported by other researchers. Efforts
were made to duplicate research methods previously used, including contacting the
primary researchers to ensure that the same essays and scales were used for the
worldview defense measure. Additionally, the present researcher attempted to reduce
error variance by conducting every experimental session herself, using a protocol to
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standardize administration between sessions. In spite of these efforts, it is possible that
there is something that the present researcher is doing that is somehow attenuating the
effects of mortality salience on the outcome measure.
As noted previously, the use of a different manipulation of mortality salience
might have been beneficial. Replications of the study using different methods of
reminding participants of their mortality could potentially yield different results.
One possible avenue for future research is the analysis of the emotional content of
the responses to the IV in the mortality salience condition. As mentioned previously,
individuals high in emotion dysregulation might have checked-out of the task when asked
to write about their own death. Participants’ written responses when asked to write about
their own death could be analyzed for differences such as word count and emotionrelated words. This could be done using a coding system with multiple raters or with a
word analysis software program such as Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC;
Pennebaker, Booth, and Francis, 2007).
The current study represents this researcher’s second failed attempt to obtain a
main effect when conducting a study using methods fairly standard in Terror
Management Theory. Additionally, the primary hypothesis that emotion dysregulation
would moderate the effects of mortality salience on worldview defense was not
supported. Exploratory analyses examined the moderating effects of neuroticism and
extraversion and found that neither was a significant moderator. However, the overall
regression model that included extraversion as a moderator was significant; the
exploration of the role of extraversion might be an interesting area for future research if
and when a main effect of condition is obtained.
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APPENDIX A
MORTALITY SALIENCE QUESTIONNAIRE

Describe the feelings that the thought of your own death arouses in you
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Describe what you think will happen to you physically as you die and once you are dead

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX B
CONTROL QUESTIONNAIRE

Describe the feelings that the thought that experiencing dental pain arouses in you
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Describe what you think will happen to physically as you are experiencing the pain.

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX C
ANTI-US ESSAY

When I first came to this country from my home in XXXXX I believed it was the
“land of opportunity” but I soon realized this was only true for the rich. The
system here is set up for the rich against the poor. All people care about here is
money and trying to have more than other people. There is no sympathy for
people. It’s all one group putting down others and nobody cares about the
foreigners. The people only let foreigners have jobs like pick fruit or wash dishes
because no American would do it. Americans are spoiled and lazy and want
everything handed to them. America is a cold country that is insensitive to needs
and problems of foreigners. It thinks it’s a great country but its not.
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APPENDIX D
PRO-US ESSAY

The first thing that hit me when I came to this country, was the incredible freedom
people had. Freedom to go to school, freedom to work any job you want. In this
country people can go to school and train for the job they want. Here anyone who
works hard can make their own success. In XXXXX most people live in poverty
with no chance of escape. In this country people have more opportunity for
success than any other and success does not depend on the group belong to. While
there are problems in any country, America truly is a great nation and I don’t
regret my decision to come here at all.
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APPENDIX E
ESSAY RATINGS

Please answer the following questions about the essay you just read. Use the following
scale:
1………....2….…...3…..……..4…..……..5….….…..6….….…..7…..……..8….………9
Not at all
Neutral
Very Much

How much do you like the author? _______
How intelligent do you think the author is? ________
How knowledgeable do you think the author is on the subject? _________
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INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD NOTICE OF COMMITTEE ACTION
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